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Abstract
Globalization  has been a  persistent phenomenon  of the  frequently conveyed  to them by the same source-banks
post-war  period. The gross volume  of cross-border  or financial  intermediaries.  The second and third
capital  flows has grown at an average  of 25 percent a  channels  emphasize  seller and buyer reputations  in
year,  and trade  in goods and  services  has also increased,  international  markets. The seller reputation channel
albeit not as dramatically,  but at least twice  as fast as  stresses the importance  given by, for example,  importers
world GDP over the past 20 years. Yet, consumers  and  in the United States who are considering buying  products
investors continue to spend and hold a disproportionate  from Italy to the experience  that Canadian  and Japanese
share of their assets in  local markets-the  so-called  importers  may have  accumulated  on Italian  exporters.
home-bias  has been  emphasized by many recent  The buyer  reputation  channel  examines to what extent a
empirical  studies. For many  researchers,  this home bias  foreign investor or trader seeks information on the
reflects information  asymmetries  and the fact that  reliability of the foreign  buyer by  assessing his reputation
acquiring information across international  borders  is  in other countries.  While the last two channels  are
relatively  costly.  equally important in explaining  bilateral  import flows,
The main objective  of the authors  is to  identify  buyer reputation  appears  to be of greater  importance for
channels  through which information  gets disseminated  equity flows  in the sample.
across international  markets.  They consider three  The authors argue that these three channels  may  help
potential  channels through which  information  can affect  provide  some insights about  the recent episodes of
import and foreign  equity purchase  decisions in  14  contagion across markets and countries that occurred
OECD countries. The  first channel consists of  over the past decade. These  information channels  can
information  spillovers from the commercial to  the  create virtuous or vicious  circles that may,  in  turn, lead
financial markets and vice-versa.  Financial  investors and  to unexpected  changes  in investors'  and traders'
importers share common  information, which  is also  behaviors across  markets.
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Globalization  has  been  a  persistent  phenomenon  of the  post-war  period.  The  gross
volume of cross-border capital flows has grown at an average of 25 percent  per year, and
trade  in  goods  and  services  has  also  increased,  albeit  not  as dramatically,  but  at  least
twice  as  fast  as  world  GDP,  over  the  past  20  years.  Yet,  consumers  and investors
continue to spend, and hold a disproportionate  share of their assets, in local markets-the
so-called "home-bias" has been emphasized  by many recent empirical  studies.  For many
researchers,  this home  bias  reflects  information  asymmetries  and the  fact that acquiring
information across international borders  is relatively costly.
The main  objective of this paper is to identify  channels  through  which information  gets
disseminated  across international  markets.  The paper considers  three  potential channels
through which information can affect import  and foreign equity purchase  decisions in  14
OECD  countries.  The  first  channel  consists  of  information  spillovers  from  the
commercial  to the  financial  markets  and vice-versa.  Financial  investors  and importers
share  common  information,  which  is  also  frequently  conveyed  to  them  by  the  same
source:  banks or financial intermediaries.  The second and third channels emphasize seller
and  buyer reputation in international  markets.  The seller reputation channel  stresses the
importance  given by,  for example,  importers  in the United  States  who  are considering
buying products from Italy to the experience  that Canadian  and Japanese  importers may
have accumulated  on Italian  exporters.  The  buyer-reputation  channel  examines to  what
extent a foreign investor or trader seeks information on the reliability of the foreign buyer
by assessing  his reputation in  other countries.  While  the  last  two channels  are equally
important  in explaining bilateral  import  flows,  buyer reputation  appears  to be of greater
importance  for equity flows in the sample considered in this paper.
Izquierdo, Morisset and Olarreaga argue that these three channels may help provide some
insights about the recent episodes of contagion across markets and countries that occurred
over the past  decade.  These  information  channels  can create  virtuous  or vicious  circles
that may, in turn,  lead to  unexpected changes  in investors and traders'  behaviors across
markets.a  lintirDlductfioi
Globalization  has  been  a persistent  phenomenon  of the  post-war  period.  The  gross
volume of cross-border  capital flows has grown at an average of 25 percent per year, and
trade  in goods  and  services  has  also increased,  albeit not as  dramatically,  but  at  least
twice as fast as world GDP, over the past 20 years.  The most common explanation  lies in
the dramatic  declines in communication and transport costs.  1
On the other hand, a growing literature  has argued that this globalization process may not
be as important as it is commonly perceived.  Trade and financial markets  still experience
an impressive "home bias" in the sense that consumers and investors continue to prefer to
spend and hold a disproportionate  share of their assets in local markets. McCallum (1995)
found  that  trade  among  Canadian  provinces  is  22  times  larger  than  trade  between
Canadian provinces  and states in the United States,  in spite of significant  trade  barriers
between these two countries.2 In  the same vein, Trefler (1995) found that a large share of
"missing  trade"  -the  fact  that  one  observes  a  much  smaller  volume  of  trade  than
predicted  by  a  factor  abundance  model-can  be  explained  by  a  bias  in  preferences
towards "home"  goods.  Similarly,  Tesar  and Warner (1998)  observed that more than 90
percent  of American  and  Japanese  equity  wealth  is  held  at home.  For  Obstfeld  and
Rogoff (2000), this "home bias" reflects  the persistence of (moderate)  trade costs as they
point out the  continuous success  of the simple  gravity approach  in explaining  trade  and
investment flows between  countries.3
lFor example,  air-shipping prices have fallen by 55 percent  since  1980 in the United States (World Bank,
2001).  Similarly, maritime shipping prices have declined by 45 percent since 1985.'  The cost of a 3-minute
telephone call between New York and London went down 99 percent between  1970 and  1997 and the cost
of information processing by a computer per instruction per second has declined more than 99.99 percent
since 1980 (World Bank,  1998).
2 An extensive  literature followed to try to explain this high number and although the latest estimates by
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) brought down this number to 6, it still exhibits and irnpressive amount
of home bias.
3There  are probably too many trade theories behind the gravity equation (Deardorff,  1998), but as
suggested by Evenett and Keller (2001), these explain different types of trade patterns across countries.
2More generally, the relative  importance of information costs on trade and financial flows
has been emphasized in several recent studies.4 Rangan and Lawrance  (1999) suggest that
firms,  in pursuing  cross-border  economic  opportunities,  engage  in  a double  process  of
identifying  potential  exchange  partners,  and  of  assessing  their  reliability  and
creditworthiness.  Both -search and deliberation-are  information intensive  processes that
are likely to be more important  in international  than domestic transactions.  Rauch (1999)
shows that proximity and common language  explain more trade in differentiated products
than  in homogenous  products  because  search costs are larger.  Evans  (2000)  establishes
that the home bias identified by McCallum (1995)  for Canada-US trade is more important
for  differentiated  than  for  homogeneous  goods,  emphasizing  the  role  played  by
information  asymmetries.  In  a  similar  vein,  Rauch  and  Trindade  (1999)  explain  the
variations in China's bilateral  trade by the role of Chinese-ethnic networks, which reduce
information  costs.  Portes  and  Rey  (1999)  find  that  the  importance  of  distance  as  a
determinant  of bilateral  trade  and  equity  flows  is  reduced  by  more  than  half when
information  flows  among  countries  are  accounted  for by  bilateral  phone  calls  and  the
number  of foreign  subsidiaries  established  in the  recipient  country.  Lastly,  Nicita  and
Olarreaga  (2000)  find  that  the  role  of information  goes  beyond  bilateral  partners  as
importers  may also  refer  to the  performance  of exporters  in third markets to  determine
their worthiness.
The objective  of this paper is to explore  three  potential  channels  through which cross-
country  information  spillovers can  influence bilateral  trade  and  equity flows.  Although
the role of information  has been emphasized  in the recent literature,  little  attention  has
been  given  to the channels  through which  it is diffused  across traders  and markets. The
first channel consists of information  spillovers between  cross border flows of equity and
goods.  Since getting information  about a specific country is costly, once  the decision has
been made to overcome these costs and  acquire information,  it may be rational to invest
in different  types of flows  simultaneously.  This can be best illustrated by considering the
role of banks or financial intermediaries,  who will acquire  information,  and then finance
4 Grossman (1998)  avers  "that we need models where distance (and common policy, and common
language,  and common culture) play more of a role. I suspect this is a model with imperfect information,
where  famniliarity declines rapidly  with distance..."
3trade,  equity,  and FDI  transactions  as well  as inform  their clients about possibilities for
investment  and trade projects  in the country.  The  concentration  of financial  (e.g.,  FDI)
and commercial  flows  in a relatively  small number of large multinationals  also suggests
information  sharing among decision-makers  within these companies.  Foreign affiliates of
multinationals  account simultaneously for morc than one fifth of world exports and for an
important  share  of FDI  worldwide;  the  100  largest  Transnational  Companies  accounted
for  about  12  percent  of total  foreign  assets  in  2000  (UNCTAD,  2001).  Thus,  the
concentration  of information in a few agents  in international markets suggests that equity
investors are  able to capture basic  information  from existing bilateral commercial  flows,
and vice-versa, leading to a strong link between these two types of flows. 5
The  second  channel  examinis  to what  extent  importers  and  equity  investors  base  their
purchasing  decisions on the performance  of the sellers in other countries.  We call this the
seller-reputation effect.  Inporters  in  the  United  States  who  are  considering  buying
products  from  Italy  may  want  to  learn  from  the  experience  of Canadian  or Japanese
importers that buy Italian products  (for  example,  do Italian exporters  deliver on time?).
Similarly, when Swiss investors  consider investing in France they may be influenced by
the  experience  of other  foreign investors  (German  or Japanese)  in France.  In addition,
Swiss  investors  and  American  importers  will  pay  more  attention  to  investors  and
importers  who are  "closer"  to them  in an information  sense  (i.e.  those  with whom they
exchange  a significant amount of information).
Finally,  the  third  channel  is  the  buyer-reputation effect.  Exporters  may  search  for
information on the experience  of other country  exporters with an importer  (for example,
does the importer pay on time?).  Similarly, before selling equity to a foreign  investor the
seller  may  seek  information  on  the  reliability  of the  foreign  buyer  by  assessing  his
reputation  in other countries.  For international  traders, access to the judiciary system may
be very  costly and the  understanding  of the  legal  system  more difficult,  suggesting  that
5  More  generally,  the empirical  interdependence  between  the current  and  capital  accounts  as  well as the
different  elements  of the capital  accounts  have  been  well  evidenced  by  several authors  (see  Dooley  and
Claessens,  1994 or Edwards,  1998).
4the  buyer and  seller reputation.potentially  plays  a larger  role for international  than  for
national transactions.
We  explore  the potential  role of these  information  channels  as determinants  of cross-
border  flows  in a panel  of 14  countries  (and  182 bilateral  relationships  for each  cross-
border  flow)  over a period of 7 years.  After correcting  for different endogeneity  biases,
and  observing  a  strong  autocorrelation  of the  error  term,  we  develop  a  simple,  new
methodology  to  estimate  a  gravity  model  with  panel  data  in  the  presence  of serial
correlation in the error term.  Results suggest, first, that bilateral imports are an important
determinant  of bilateral  equity  outflows,  but  the  reverse  is  less  true,  suggesting  that
investors  partially  base their  actions  on observed  trade  flows,  wnereas  importers  do not
seem to rely as much on information provided by investors abroad. This finding may also
indicate that  information  that leads to decisions  regarding purchases  of goods may also
lead to decisions regarding  ownership of firms that produce those goods.  Second, there is
strong  evidence  of buyer- and  seller-reputation effects  in  international  goods  markets.
Third,  in equity markets  there  is strong  evidence  of buyer-reputation effects,  whereas
there is little evidence of seller-reputation  effects.
Although  some information  channels seem more important than others,.the  information-
content of cross-border flows appears to be an important determinant of bilateral imports
and equity outflows.  We believe that this finding provides  some insights into the recent
episodes of contagion in financial and commercial  markets across countries  over the past
few  years  (see  Carnazza  et  al.  2000  and  Van  Rijckeghem  and  Weder,  2001).
Information  flows  not  only  from  one  country  to  another  through  seller  and  buyer
reputation  channels  but also  across commercial  and equity markets  when investors  are
usinig the same sources of information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 develops a simple model to
explain the  role  of the  information  content  of rest-of-the  world cross  border  flows  in
determining bilateral trade flows;  Section 3 presents the empirical methodology, whereas
section 4 presents the results; Section 5 concludes.
52  A SfimmpRle  ModeR
The  model  developed  here  is  a simple  extension  of the  probability  model  proposed by
Leamer and  Stern (1970), where cross-border  flows are viewed as being generated by a
large  number of independent  transactions.  World trade  and equity flows  are respectively
defined  as  M = 21 m, and E = 1,  e,, where  m,  are total  imports of country  i and  e,  are
total  equity  outflows  of country i. Shares  of country  i's in total  world trade  and equity
flows are then defined  as  s'  = m, /M and  s'  = e, /E.
The  probability  that  buyers  and  sellers  of products  and  equities  across  international
borders  agree  on  a  particular  transaction  will  depend  on  transaction  costs  among
countries.  Transaction  costs  are  a  function  of  geographic  distance  among  countries,
language,  cultural  differences  and  more  importantly  the  extent  to  which  information
flows among countries. Information on potential buyers and sellers reliability will tend to
reduce  transaction  costs.  This  information  could  be  obtained  from  other  countries.  For
example, transaction costs between buyers in country i and sellers inj will depend on the
extent  that  information  on j's seller  performance  with  other  countries  is  provided  to
buyers in country i, and vice versa.
Another source of reduction in transaction costs, between an importer  in i and an exporter
in j,  is the  information  revealed  by existing cross border  equity  flows between  i and j.
Similarly,  the existence  of trade flows  between i and j  may reveal  information  for cross
border investors in i andj. These  information flows  could even be internal to the firm as
argued earlier.
Summarizing  all  the determinants  of transaction  costs  described  above,  the  transaction
costs for flowf (f  = m,e)  are given by Cf = cf (d,j;  ;  i  f,  f );where  d,,  1is
the  distance  between  countries  i and j;  Q,, is  the  bilateral  information  flow  between
countries  i and];  Qk  I is the  information that country i obtains  from other countries (k)
6on  the  perforrnance  of j;  Qk  is  the  information  that  country j  obtains  from  other
countries (k)  on the performance of i; and f,f is the other flow (equity or trade) between
i andj.  The three last variables  capture the three channels  described in the introduction:
seller  reputation,  I  ,  buyer  reputation,  ,  and  information  spillovers  between
equity and import flows, f,f.
Assuming that the matching of buyers and sellers  is independently drawn from the pool
of potential  cross-border flows in the world, and that the probability  of them agreeing  on
a  particular  transaction,  or,  depends  on  the  extent  of transaction  costs,  then  the
probability that one will observe a flowf  f  = m, e) between countries i and j is given by:
P,J =S SfIC  =S, 5  cf (d,,j;  d2,j;.(,  1;t  r  f,'f)  1
The expected  value of country  i purchasing equity or goods (imports) from  country j  is
then given by:
e,  =E  PeC  =  E'  cc  d1j;Q j.;Kk  'j;Qk-di';m,,
(2)
m,,  = MP } =  M  c  j(d  X  ;Q  )
Assuming  that  transaction  costs  functions  are  log-linear  and  that  total  flows  from  a
particular country depend log-linearly on the size (GDP) and level of development (GDP
per capita, noted  y/l)  of the country, the expressions  in equation (2) can be rewritten as
information-augrnented  gravity equations:
7log(e,)= - log(E) + Alog(y,) + /62 1og(y)  + /3  log(,)  +04  log(e  1  ) +
/35 log(d,,,)  +  7  0log(Q;, ) + ,8  log(Qk  ) + ,9  log(kQ,') + A6l  log(m;,,)
log(m,, )= -log(M)+  i  log(y,) +22  log(y,) + 23 log(,) + A4 log(e,)  + 2A  log(d,,,) +
A7 log(Q,,) + 28 log(Qk-,)  + As log(Q,')  + 2,  log(e,,)
We will base the empirical  analysis on a stochastic version of the expressions  in equation
(3). All parameters  are  expected to be positive except  for  /3,/4,2l  3,2I  4, that capture the
impact  of  GDP  per  capita  (through  population)  on  import  and  equity  flows,  and
P5 and X 5 which  capture  the  impact  of geographic  distance  on  the  transaction  cost
between two trading partners. Parameters  with subscripts 7 to  10 capture  the information
content  of  cross-border  flows.  Common  language,  which  is  also  a  determinant  of
transaction costs, will be introduced as a dummy variable in both equations.
3  EmIpLricall  Strategy
We  apply  the  model  to  a  sample  of  14  developed  countries  from  1990  to  1996.6
Although this sample may appear limited at first sight,  it is useful to recall that, in 1996,
these 14 countries represented more than 86 percent of global equity capitalization,  about
97  percent of equity  flows,  74 percent  of world  GDP,  and  65  percent of world  trade.7
The  absence  of developing  countries  is  explained  by  the  non-availability  of data  on
bilateral equity flows.8
6These are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong,  Italy, Japan, Netherlands,  Scandinavia
(Sweden, Norway, Finland),  Singapore,  Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
7 Sources are Tesar (1998) for capitalization  figures, World Development Indicators for trade and GDP
figures, and IMF's International  Financial Statistics for equity flows.
8  We also attempted to introduce  Foreign Direct Investment outflows  in our model, but results of the FDI
equation were very poor, probably  due to the quality of the data (The OECD International  Foreign Direct
Investment  statistics only report "net"  outflows).  Also,  the usual criteria  (i.e.,  more than  10  percent equity
investment  to be  classified  as FDI)  is not clear-cut  and both  flows  are  frequently  confused,  especially  in
case of mergers or privatization (see Graham and Krugman, 1995 for a few examples).
8As  in Portes  and  Rey  (1999),  data on bilateral  equity flows  was  obtained  from Cross-
Border  Capital.  Bilateral  equity  outflows  (e,,)  are  measured  as  equity  purchases  of
residents  of country i  in the equity  markets of country j.9 Bilateral  imports  (mi,,)  only
include  trade  in  goods  (from  United  Nations'  Comtrade  database)  because  figures  on
bilateral  service trade are not so accurate.  GDP ( y ) and population (e) data are from the
World  Development  Indicators  of the  World  Bank.  Bilateral  distance  (d,,)  was
calculated as the geographic distance between capitals.
To proxy for bilateral  information  flows (Q,,) across countries we followed Portes and
Rey  (1999)  and  used  the  volume  of telephone  call  traffic  from  country  i to  country j
provided  by  the  International  Telecommunication  Union  (ITU).  We  also  used  an
alternative  proxy  defined  as the  bilateral trade  in newspapers, and  periodicalsl  because
dala  on  bilateral  phone  calls  by  ITU  has  several  missing  values  for  our  sample  of
countries.  Moreover,  by using  the  newspaper  data,  we are  able  to  distinguish  between
imports and exports of newspapers  and so identify the direction of the  information  flow.
Such a distinction was not possible with the data on bilateral phone calls, given that it is
difficult  a priori to  know  in  which  direction  the  information  flows  in  a  telephone
conversation."  These two  proxies  are  however  highly  correlated  as  shown  in Figure  1
(the correlation coefficient  is 0.77 and significant at the 1 percent level).'2
Next,  we measure the two information  channels that have been emphasized in this paper:
seller and buyer reputation, for both imports and equities, as follows (for  f  = e,m):
9 We only include purchases  and exclude sales,  unlike Portes and Rey (1999) to capture  gross rather than
"net" equity outflows.
'° See Nicita and Olarreaga (2000).
" Note that the data has information on who  called, but this may be completely  orthogonial to the direction
of the information flow.
12 In the late  1990s a better proxy. for bilateral information flows could be internet traffic. However,
information on bilateral internet traffic is not available to our knowledge.  Given that our sample ends in
1996, newspaper and phone-call traffic seem relatively good proxies.
9g2ki =  W  Tk  and Q  Ek-J  - J
4 i,k
lk  i  J4
QJ  = E  T  ekJ  and  Q,  =j  E  k ei,k
k  ni  k  J
where  QT is  the total  volume  of international  phone calls  of country j.  Alternatively,
when we use  exports  of newspapers,  Q T is defined  as the rest of the  world exports  of
newspapers to countryj.
The  first two  equations  capture  the  seller  and  buyer  reputation  channels  for  imports,
while the last two do so for equities.  It might be useful to recall the assumptions  behind
the  construction  of these information  variables.  The  seller reputation  channel  captures
the idea, for example,  that a German importer assesses the reputation of a US  exporting
firm by accounting  for the willingness of other buyers to purchase the US firm's exports.
Furthermore,  he  incorporates  the  behavior  of  other  investors  in  his  own  decision
proportionally  to the flow of information that he will receive  from them.  Specifically,  in
the  case  of country  i  imports  from  country j,  the  seller-reputation  channel  Q,k'  is
defined  as  the  weighted-sum  of all  country  k imports  from country j  weighted  by the
share  of  information  exchanged  between  country  i  and  each  country  k  which  has
imported  from countryj. 13  The buyer-reputation  channel  Q,4;' is defined  in  the  same
manner.  In the  case  of imports,  it is equal  to the iiiformation-weighted  sum of imports
that country i buys from all k countries,  weighted by the share of information exchanged
between exporterj and all k countries which export to country i. The same definition of
seller and buyer-reputation channels applies to equity outflows.
1 When phone calls are used as the information variable, the information flow is defined as the sum of
phone calls from country i to country k and from country k to country i. This flow is divided by the sum of
total bilateral phone calls between country i and other countries  to deterrnine the information share.  When
newspaper exports are used as the information weights, they are defined as exports of newspapers from k to
i divided by total imports of newspapers by country i
10We  faced  a  series  of problems  in  estimating  equations  (3).  A  priori,  one  could  use
ordinary least squares  (OLS), pooling the whole data set and introducing  year dummies to
capture  the  size  of  world  trade  and  equity  flows  (M and E)  and  all  other  missing
variables that  are year  specific  and invariant  across countries.  A first  set of regressions
along these lines is presented in the next section.
However,  there  are  several  simultaneity  problems  that  need  to  be  dealt  with  when
estimating  equations  (3).  The  first  problem  is  that  equity  flows  and  imports  are  by
assumption  endogenous  to  each  other  and  therefore  they  need  to  be  estimated
simultaneously in order to obtain unbiased estimates.  We accounted for this problem by
estimating both equations  simultaneously  and using  as instruments  market capitalization
in  each  country,  and  import  and  export  taxes. 
14 The  second  problem  is  that  our
information  variables  described  in  equations  (4)  (the  buyer-  and  seller-reputation
variables)  are  constructed  using  trade  and  equity  flows  between  countries,  thus
introducing  simultaneity  by  construction.  It  is  straightforward  to  see  that  these  four
variables  are  correlated  with  the  error  term.  In  order  to  correct  for  this  we  used  the
information  variables  as  described  in  (4),  only  that  they  were  instrumented  by  the
information-weighted  sum of all other  exogenous  variables  in (3)  (see Anselin,  2001)15.
The  last  simultaneity  issue  to  tackle  is  that  informnation  flows  may  themselves  be
endogenous.  Indeed,  an  increase  in trade or  cross-border  equity  flows may  not only be
caused  by better  information,  but  may  also  cause  higher  demand  for  information.  We
used  telephone  infrastructure  (number  of fixed  lines)  and  number  of newspapers  in
circulation  in  each  country  as  instruments  for  bilateral  phone  calls  and  exports  of
newspapers to account for this issue in our system regressions.
An additional  econometric  issue we faced  is the influence  of cyclical factors  (e.g., world
recession  or terms  of trade  changes)  on  some of our variables.  Such an  influence  could
14 One could think that the information variables would be sufficient to identify the system of simultaneous
equations,  but as discussed below all information variables are potentially endogenous.
15 That is,  we construct information  weighted sums of GDP,  population,  etc, to instrument  seller and buyer
reputation variables,  using weights for each explanatory variable which are identical to those used in the
construction of seller and buyer reputation variables.  Both phone calls and newspaper exports used tosignificantly  bias the estimated  coefficients  associated with our inforrnation variables  if
omitted. In order to control for this, we first introduced time dummies and OECD average
growth rates in the pooled regression, as suggested by Portes and Rey (1999).  16  We found
out  that  this  method  was  not  satisfactory  because  it  did  not  control  for  serial
autocorrelation  inherent  to  import  and  equity  flows  (as  shown  by the  extremely  low
Durbin-Watson  statistics  presented  in  the  next  section).  Given  these  residual
characteristics,  we opted for  an alternative approach that uses a generalized  least squares
technique  to  account for  serial correlation.  Modifying  the typical  approach that  stacks
data  by  country  members,  we  stacked  data  by  years  so  that  the  estimated  residual
covariance  matrix  captures the correlation  of error terms across  years.  By doing so,  we
obtained a system composed of fourteen equations:  seven for equity purchases  and seven
for  imports  (one  for each  of the  seven  years  in the  sample).  We then  constrained  the
coefficients  of each of the seven regressions  corresponding to each type of flow to be the
same  for each  year  (except  for  yearly  constants,  which  capture  the  effects  of cyclical
variables).  More  formally,  we exploited  the  asymptotic  in the  cross-section  domain  to
obtain  estimates  of serial  dependence,  and  therefore  correct  for autocorrelation  of the
error term.
Finally,  given  the  endogeneity  between  import  and  equity  flows  discussed  above,  the
estimator we used for this constrained system of 14 equations is three stages least squares
(3SLS)  that  allows  to  estimate  the  14  equations  simultaneously  while  imposing
necessary constraints on estimates.
4  Results
We present the  estimated  results  for equation  (3) using  the standard OLS  and the 3SLS
approaches  that were described in the preceding section.  The results obtained with OLS
construct weights are those already instrumented by existing  phone lines or total newspaper sales,
respectively.
16 Following Portes and Rey (1999), we also included regional dummies for European countries, East Asian
countries,  and Western  Hemisphere countries.  Like in  many  other gravity-type  estimations, we also
included a common language dummy.  For simplicity, these are not included in  the functional forms
presented here.
12(Table  1) are useful  because  they  can  be compared  with previous empirical  studies that
have included  some of our information variables.  They basically indicate that our results
are consistent with previous gravity-type  estimates  and that all our information  variables
matter  on  the  magnitude  of  bilateral  commercial  and  financial  flows.  Perhaps  most
interestingly,  the  estimated  elasticities  of  distance  decline  significantly  once  the
information  variables  are introduced.  This suggests  that an important  share of what was
previously  captured  by the  distance  coefficient  is better proxied  by information  related
variables.17 Also note that the number of observations  varies in each equation because we
do not have data on bilateral  information flows  for all observations  (as discussed earlier,
data on exports of newspapers is more complete than data on bilateral phone calls).
As explained  earlier,  these  results  are however  biased by endogeinity  issues and by the
influence  of residual  autocorrelation  (note  the extremely  low Durbin-Watson  estimates
suggesting  positive  autocorrelation  of the  error  term).'8 For  this  reason,  we  focus  our
attention  on  interpreting  the  findings  obtained by using  3SLS  (Table  2) that  uses  the
asymptotic in the cross-section domain to estimate the time dependence of the error term.
Given that a priori we did not have a particular preference  for the use of phone  calls or
newspaper  exports  in constructing  information variables,  we estimated  the  system with
these  two information  variables  alternately.  The  most  interesting  result  consists  of the
significant  role  played  by information  variables  on  bilateral  flows  of imports  of goods
and  equity  purchases,  showing  that  buyer  and  seller  reputation  channels  have  an
influence  on top  of standard  gravity  measures  such  as  distance  and  standard  bilateral
information  flows (such as bilateral  phone calls),  even after controlling for all the sources
of bias that were present in the OLS specification.
Both seller and buyer reputation are  significant in explaining bilateral  import behavior at
the  one percent  level when using newspapers,  and at the five percent  level  when using
phone  calls.  By contrast,  buyer reputation  seems  to be the  only significant  information
17 See Grossman (1998)  and Portes and Rey (1999) for a discussion along these lines.
l8 The Durbin-Watson estimates  have been calculated using Bhargava et aL (1982) extension to panel data.
13channel  in  explaining  bilateral  equity  outflows.  This  channel  may  not  only  capture
reputation  effects,  such  as  the  fact that  when  firms  place  their  equity they  need  to be
careful  in selecting  their partners,  but also that some  markets  may be more  liquid than
others.  To the extent that there is no perfect arbitrage across markets, equity issuers from
one country may learn from other equity issuers that a particular market or country may
be particularly attractive in terms of liquidity to place equity. Also, the fact that the seller-
reputation  effect  is insignificant  in the  case of equity  flows  does  not  imply that  seller
reputation  is  not  important.  Rather,  it  suggests  that  this  information  is  not  obtained
through  other  buyers.  One  reason  for  this  is that  in  the case  of firms  quoted  in  stock
markets,  most  of the  information  needed  is  simply  obtained  by  observing  the  firm's
valuation in the stock market.
The specification that uses phone calls as the main information  variable has the problem
that the  sign of phone calls is negative  for imports  equations  (although it has the correct
sign in equity equations).  We also included the newspaper variable to see whether  it had
any  additional  explanatory  power on top of that provided  by phone  calls,  and it is only
significant  for  imports  equations  (and  negative  but  not  significant  in  the  equity
equations).  By contrast, the  specification  that uses newspapers  as the main information
variable  has  the  right  sign  for  bilateral  newspaper  exports  in  both  import  and  equity
equations,  whereas  phone  calls  seem to have  no additional  explanatory  power in either
type  of equations.  The  more  parsimonious  results  observed  in  the  system  that  uses
newspapers  as the main  information  variable  can  be explained  by the  fact that data on
bilateral phone calls has several missing values for our sample of countries, as well as the
fact that by using the newspaper proxies, we can distinguish between imports and exports
of newspapers  and  so  identify  the  direction  of the  information  flow,  something  that
cannot be done with the data on bilateral  phone calls.  Thus, we keep the system that uses
the newspaper information variable as our preferred specification.
For our preferred specification,  spillover effects are relevant from imports into equity, but
not vice-versa.  This is shown by the fact that bilateral imports are significant in bilateral
equity purchases  equations  at the  one  percent  level,  whereas  equity  purchases  are  not
14significant  in import equations.  This provides evidence that the fact that countries trade
between themselves  opens  up opportunities  for  other types  of transactions/investments.
Adjusted  R2 measures range between 0.68 and 0.72 for imports and 0.54-0.70 for equity,
depending on the year.
For completeness,  we  also  explored  estimation  of the  system using  newspapers  as  the
main  information  variable  for  imports  and  phone  calls  for equity,  as  well  as a  fourth
specification,  where we use phone calls as the relevant information  variable for imports,
and newspapers  for  equity.  Results  are  presented  in  Table  2a.  The  specification  using
phone calls  for equity and  newspapers  for imports  merits  attention,  particularly  because
of the  strong impact of the phone  information  variable on equity.  Keeping  in mind that
newspaper  exports  and  bilateral  phone  calls  are  only proxies  for  bilateral  information
flows, one may argue that the type of information that is diffused through bilateral phone
calls has different properties from the one diffused through  newspapers. In particular one
would  expect bilateral  phone  calls to be a better proxy for private  information,  whereas
newspapers  may  be  a  better  proxy  for  public  information.  If  one  believes  that
international  equity flows  are more  private-information  intensive,19 then  a specification
that proxies  the relevant information flows  for equity using phone  calls  and for imports
using newspaper  exports may be the adequate  one.  Cross-spillover  effects are significant
at the  one percent level  in both imports and equity equations.  Buyer reputation remains
robust  to  this  alternative  specification  both  for  imports  and equity  equations,  but  not
seller reputation in the case of imports that becomes insignificant.  The same is true when
the sources of information  are reversed  in the  import and equity  equations  (see the  last
two columns in Table 2).
Our estimated  equations contain a few additional  variables -beyond our three channels-
that may capture the influence of information on bilateral imports  and equities.  The role
played by bilateral  distance  in imports varies across different  specifications,  but it is not
significant in all specifications.  Yet it makes sense that it remains significant given that it
19 One needs only to briefly visit a  trading room to notice the importance of phone calls in the decision of
equity investors.
15plays an important  role in capturing  transport costs.  Distance  also remains  significant in
most  equity  specifications,  but  its  contribution  to  the  explanation  of equity  flows  is
smaller than in the standard gravity model that excludes  information  variables.  The use
of a common  language  between  any two countries  also  significantly  enhances  bilateral
flows.  This  result  is  consistent with  previous empirical  findings  (see Melitz,  2002  for
recent  evidence).  Note,  however,  that  the  size  of the  coefficient  in  front  of "common
language"  declines  significantly when we introduce the information variables,  as was the
case  with  distance  (see  Table  1) Total  bilateral  trade of newspapers  and/or phone  calls
also  contributes  to  the  explanation  of both  imports  and  equities  flows,  although  the
analysis above reveals that phone calls may be more important for equity flows.
Other results  merit  a brief explanation.  Almost all the other estimated  coefficients  are
statistically significant at the 99 percent  level with the exception of a few variables. 20 As
expected,  market  capitalization  and  trade  policies  (import  and  export taxes)  are  robust
determinants of equity and import flows respectively.
5  Counnd1udnig  Rem-%irks
This  paper  confirms  that  information  matters  for  investors  and traders  in  international
markets.  Because collecting information is costly, most agents may follow what others
are doing or tend to focus  on what they know best, explaining the home bias observed in
the  recent  literature  on  trade  and  international  finance.  Even  though  the  role  of
information  has  been  well  established,  there  have  been  surprisingly  few  attempts  to
identify the channels through which it is diffused across markets and agents.
We identified  three  basic  channels.  The  first channel  consists of information  spillovers
between imports and equity markets.  Financial  investors  and importers  seem to react to
20 The population variables do not appear significant in the equity equation perhaps because our sample
includes only highly developed countries  (the population coefficient  is supposed to capture the level of
development,  as in principle  it controls for GDP per capita).  GDP coefficients appear in equity equations
with a negative  sign.  We attribute this to the fact that GDP and market capitalization may be collinear.
16the same set of information,  which is frequently  conveyed  to them by the  same  source:
banks or financial  intermediaries.  Infornation on the profitability of conducting trade in
goods with a partner may also reveal information about the profitability of other types of
investment,  such as equity.  For example,  an  increase  in imports  by Switzerland  from
Canada  is  likely  to positively  influence  cross-border  purchases  of Canadian  equity  by
Swiss investors.  The second  and third channels  emphasize  seller and buyer reputation in
international  markets.  We provide empirical evidence that these two last channels matter
for  bilateral  import flows,  while only buyer reputation  plays a significant  role in equity
markets.  Both  seller  and  buyer  reputation  are  strongly  influenced  by  the  level  of
information  that  investors or importers  receive  from  international  markets.  The  higher
the level of information  (as measured by telephone  calls or newspapers),  the greater will
be the impact of reputation channels on bilateral flows.
The above  results provide  some insights  about recent episodes of contagion  in financial
and commercial  markets  across countries.  Let us take as a starting point  a US firm that
suffers  from an abrupt breach in the quality of its products,  leading German importers to
cut their purchases.  Importers in other countries  interpret this decline in German imports
as a source of bad news about the US firm -our seller reputation channel.  The higher the
flows of information received by other importers  are, the greater will be their reduction in
imports.  For example,  Swiss importers  would be  more influenced  than,  say,  Australian
importers,  because  their  information  linkages  with  Germany  are  higher  (language,
newspapers,  phone calls).  Furthermore,  this decline  in bilateral  imports between  the US
and  Germany,  if large  enough,  would  send  a  negative  message  to  German  financial
investors,  who  will  in  turn  reduce  their  equity  investments  (our  first channel).  This
interconnection  between  import  and  equity  bilateral  flows  is  enhanced  by  the  role  of
banks  and  financial  intermediaries,  who  are  likely  to provide  not only information  but
also financing  to  most investors  and  importers  in their international  operations.  It must
also be noticed that to the extent that there is more than one source of uncertainty, there is
another  avenue  for contagion.  If investors  cannot  distinguish between a  quality shock,
which  is  clearly  related  to  reputation,  and,  say,  a productivity  shock,  which  does  not
reduce  product quality but does reduce  produced  quantity, then productivity  shocks may
17be  interpreted  as  quality  shocks  and  lead  to lower  imports  from other  countries,  even
when  product  quality  remains  unaffected21. These  examples  show  that  information
channels  across  markets  can  create  virtuous  or  vicious  circles,  explaining  contagion
effects  that  have  appeared  in  several  episodes  in  intemational  markets  over the  past
decade.
Finally,  since  buyer and  seller reputation do  influence  the behavior  of several  investors
and  traders  across  markets,  our  approach  raises  the  question  of  the  govermnent's
intervention in the diffusion of information. There might be a role for promotion agencies
-export  and  investment-in  diffusing  information  and marketing  trade  and  investment
opportunities.  The success of a few agencies such as the Ireland's  Industrial Development
Agency and  Singapore's  Economic  Development  Board seem to support this argument.
Still,  little  is  known  about these  agencies,  suggesting  that  more  evidence  needs  to  be
collected both in industrial and developing countries.
21  An example along these lines on informational  problems for bond flows can be found in Calvo (1999).
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22Table 1: Bilateral imports and equity flows: the role of information (Pooled OLS)'
Imports  Equities  Imports  Equities  Imports  Equities
GRAVITY VARIABLES  (in,,j)  (e,,)  (m1J)  (e?, )  (i  )  (e,  )
GDP reporter  (yJ)  0 80  2.97  0 46  0.47  0.45  0.97
(0 09)***  (0 26)***  (0.09)***  (0 23)**  (0 08)***  (0 22)***
GDP partner  (y,)  1.62  2.18  1.26  0 76  1.00  0.89
(0.08)***  (0 24)***  (0 08)***  (0 27)***  (0.09)***  (0.25)***
Population reporter (e,)  -0.32  -2.25  -0.29  -0 63  -0 09  -1.01
(0.09)***  (0.27)***  (0 08)***  (0.24)***  (0 09)  (0,22)***
Population partner  (e,)  -1.03  -1.22  -1.00  -0 53  -0.71  -0.51
(0.08)***  (0.25)***  (0 08)***  (0.26)**  (0.08)***  (0 24)**
Distance  (dj)  -0.31  -0.76  0.12  -0.04  -006  -016
_  d, 1)  (0 08)***  (0.08)***  (0.03)***  (0.08)  (0 03)**  (0.07)**
OECD growth  0.01  0.30  0.02  0.30  -0 02  0.30
(0.04)  (0.15)**  (0.04)  (0.13)***  (0.04)  (0.13)**
Europe dummy  0.96  -0.83  0 97  -1.23  0 82  -1.29
______________________________  (0.06)***  (0.23)  (0 05)***  (0 22)***  (0.06)***  (0.20)***
East Asia dummy  1 24  1.89  0.89  0.47  0.84  0 46
(0.13)***  (0 23)***  (0. 11)***  (0.24)*  (0  13)***  (0 21)**
W Hemisph. dummy  1.53  -0.78  1.42  -1.51  1 71  -0 87
(0.12)***  (0.26)***  (0 11)***  (0 35)***  (0 14)***  (0.32)***
Common Language Dummy  0.57  2.20  -0.25  0.34  0.11  0.52
(0.07)***  (0.16)***  (0 08)***  (0.18)*  (0.07)  (0.15)***
INFORMATION  VARIABLES  ___
Phone callsQ, ,  . 045  0 56
'  . . . . .(0)04)}}'  o  {  .I o),  .':  '__'___
Oil  30.
Buyer-reputation  . (0 0:1  L  I0.06)'" -
using bilaleral  phone-calls  . ._.__.__._
-~  . .0.  - -,.006-,  . 078  .
Sd11er-Reputation  C2J  .,..(.4  - (.5
using bilateral  phone calls  - .
Trade in  newspapers  IC,  I  '  - ';-'  - .10  0.19
_030.-  - ..  0.3)*8
Buyer-reputation  | QA0  30  :0.386)}
using newspaper exports
-0.06  0  77
SeXller-Reputation  .(0.04"  (0 04)*-}
using newspa  er exports
Imports  (M.  )  6  . 3  tJ63  0.57
Equit)  (.?,,)  0.0  0 09
(001)  ~  ~  ~  (0'l,
-~~  ~  ~~  ~  ~  --  - - -1t  0  }$  ;  |1,))
R2-adjusted  0 76  0.46  0.83  0 62  0.82  0.64
#of observations  1274  1274  1028  1028  1236  1236
Durbin-Watson  0.07  0.73  0.08  1.15  0.18  1.14
*  All regressions  include time dummies  for 1991  to  1996  (1990 is excluded as time dummies  are correlated  with OECD growth)  Figures in  parenthesis
are White-consistent  standard errors (*  indicates significance at the I percent level, **  at the 5 percent  level and *  at the 10 percent  level)  All varnables
are taken  in  logs except  for OECD  growth and the time and regional dummies  The Durbm-Watson  is estimated  using Bhargava et al  (1982)  formula for
panel data using the 182  bilateral relationships as the cross-section  dimension
23Table 2: Bilateral imports and equity flows:  the role of information  (3SLS by year)'
|  Imports  Equities  Imports  Equities
GRAVITY VARIABLES  I  (m,)  (eu)  (ml,)  |  (eJ,)
GDP reporter  (y  0.36  -1.20  0.11  -7  30
l  (0  10)444  (0 34)4*4  (0.  10)  (0..36)*44
GDP partner(v  )  0.73  -2.18  0.51  -0.74
V  (0  10)444  ~(  37)*  (0 09)***  (0.40)
oe~  0 43  0  18  -0.43  -0.72
Population reporter  t  (0  15)44  (0 11)  (0 09)***  (0  60)
Population partner  (el  0.17  0.16  -0.51  -0.44 Populaionprtner(0.14)***  (0.14)  (0 09)***  (0.55)
Distance  (d,  -0  30  0.18  -0 41  -0 59
(004)***  (0.11)  ()04)**  (013)**
Europe dummy  0 93  -1 44  1  03  -0.83
.__  __ _ __ _ _  _  (0.13)***  (0.31)***  (0.14)44*  (O 33)4*
East Asia dummy  0.40  -0  11  0  40  0 14
(0.22)4  (0.45)  (0  24)4  (0 45)
W Hemisph. dummy  1 92  -3.68  1.90  -1.30
(O  36)*4*  (0.74)t**  (0.41)***  (0.76)*
Common Language Dummy  0 52  -0 83  0.70  0 66
(0.09)44*  (0.07)4**  (0.09)***  (0.24)***
Market capitalization  reporter  0.16  -0 05
(0.14)  (  020)
Market capitalization partner  0 79  0.94
(0  12)***  (0.17)4*4
Import taxes of the reporter  -0.04  -0 07
(0  01)44*  (0.01)444
Import taxes of the partner  -0.05  -0 05
(0 01)***  (0.01)  _  _  _
Export taxes of the reporter  0.61  1.83
(0.68)  (0 83)44  .
Export taxes of the partner  -1 77  -2.39
(0 68)44  (0.80)_  _  _
INFORMATION  VARIABLES
Phone calls  (QT ,)  -1.74  8.43  0.01  1.27
(0.3~)T**  1  144~  (0.02)  (-9
r ~  0.11  0.03
Seller-reputaton  Q k  .J  (0.04)444  (0 08)
using bilateral phone-calls  .
f  0.11  0.56
Buyer-Reputation  k+  k  (0.05)**  (0.08)44e
using bilateral phone calls  _
Trade in newspapers  (043  -0.30  0.78 °,01
________  _______  _______  _______  _______  _____  0_ __4  ____  (0.19)  (0.006Y1  (0.29)40*4
0.26  -0.18
Seller-reputation  (O0.0)***  (0.12)
using newspaper exports
r  . 0.25.  0.81
Buyer-Reputation  >W  (°  )t  (0.09***
using newspaper exports  _
Imports  (m,~)  ____  _  1.99  0.07
Im  ports  __  __  __  __  ___M__  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (0.01)***
Equity  (e,  )  0.01  0.01
I  .1  )f  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  (0.1
R1-adjusted  0 73-0 77  0.41-0.55  0 68-0.72  0.54-0.70
# of observations  |  2056  2056  2056  2056
* Figures in parenthesis  are standard errors  (4*  indicates  significance  at the I percent level;  °  at the 5  percent level  and 4 at the  10
percent level)  The first two columns and the last two columns are estimated  simultaneously.
24Table 2a: Bilateral imports and equity flows: the role of information (3SLS by year)
Imports  Equities  Imports  E  uities
GRAVITY  VARIABLES  (m,j)  (e,j)  (m,,/)  (e,J)
GDP reporter (y,)  0 31  -107  0 47  0 04
(0 09)***  (0 34)***  (0  13)***  (0 29)
GDP partner (,yJ )  (0  87  -177  0 83  -0 62
GDP  partner  (Y.  ~~~(0  06)***  (0 38)***  (0  12)***  (0 31)**
-0.14  -173  037  -0 57
Population  reporter  I(-J  (0 09)  (0 54)***  (0 21)  (0 27)**
Population  partner  (e  )  -0.42  -0 74  -0 01  011
J  ~~~~~~~~(0  07)***  (0 52)  (0 21)  (0 27)
Dista.nce  (d,  -0.33  -0  17  -0  18  -0  37
Distance  (d,,  )  (0 04)***  (o  11)  (0 04)***  (0  10)***
Europe dummy  0.83  -1.20  0 89  -0 95
(0  13)***  (0.32)***  (0  13)***  (0 31)***
East Asia dummy  0.98  -0.46  0.76  -0 29
(0.23)***  (0 45)  (0 22)***  (0 45)
W  Hemisph. dummy  1 60  -2.77  1 85  -1  98
(0 39)***  (0 77)***  (0 37)**  (0.77)***
Common Language Dummy  0.37  0 02  0 47  0 47
(0 10)***  (0 24)  (0 22)**  (0 22)**
Market capitalization  reporter  0 46  0 45
(0  18)***  (0  15)***
Market capitalization  partner  1.11  0 88
(O  15)***  (0  13)***
Import taxes of the reporter  -0.06  -0 07
(0.01)***  (0.02)***
Import taxes of the partner  -0.02  -0 03
(0.01)  (0 02)*
Export taxes of the reporter  -0.02  0 74
(0.65)  (1.05)
Export taxes of the partner  0.09  -1 09
(0  65)  (I  05)
INFORMATION VARIABLES  . ._._.
Phone calls  IhI.,  )  . . . -i  _4
I  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  I ~~~~~~28ic;  ~  if 43)"
. ,  i  . . . - -fl)  09  0 12
Seller.repuianon  |  J  |  . ,!  l  -u06)  - - . -
using bilaleral  phone-calls  ._.  _  ,,_.__._.__-_-
. - ,l  63  0 13
Buyer-Repuianon  to-  : - !I l  1008)
using bilateral  phone calls  -
Trade in newspapers  |Q ,)  022  .2  . .0.t)7  - -
_  i05).  - . . '  tl  8i
0 0,i '  0 10i
Seller-repulation  i  l  (0-01_)  . - f (O91
using newspaper  exports
in  k,  A0  23  . . '.  _..,  0 71i
Buer-Reputaticn  '  Q  023*...  - . (  01
using nesspaper exports  . .
Imports  (m,, )  ..  . . {1  . - . - 114
t~  17i'______  ______  _____  O 16 j1  "
Equin  (e,)  . 007  -IS.-
iO0  0  I) ".  . __  _  __  _  __  _  0  (  J1)  ___  __  __  __  _
adjusted  0.79-0.80  0 50-0.64  0 68-0.78  0 57-0 69
# of observations  2302  2302  2302  2302
* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors  (*** indicates  significance  at the  I percent level, **  at the 5  percent  level and * at the  10
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